Leopardi: philosophy, philosophers
and other questions.
By
Prof.Ernesto PELLECCHIA
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A
research on Leopardi the philosopher. A recent work by Prof. E.Pellecchia,
original Promoter and Creator of the Giovenale prize (Aquinate literary event).
The original Italian version is available in Open Access at the following link:
https://zenodo.org/records/14246558 .
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“Philosophy
is the science with which or without which one stands still at the same
stitch”.
This
is the goliardic aphorism spread among students who do not like philosophy and
use this singular formula to denounce its substantial uselessness in the
process of knowledge and intellectual and cultural formation that they are
facing.
There
is no doubt that linguistically and conceptually this definition presents evident
characteristics of crudeness; nevertheless in the apparent banality of that
formula lies a sort of prejudicial “hostility”, an instinctive refusal, a real
repulsion towards a discipline considered, instead, by philosophers, scholars
and teachers, among the noblest and most formative disciplines of the
intellectual structure of young students..
There
would be no mention of this singular and virtual logomachy, fought, moreover,
by contenders equipped with visibly unequal weapons, if in support, at least in
some aspects, of the thesis of those students there had not been an illustrious
and unsuspected defense attorney: Giacomo Leopardi. And it would be wrong to
think that the poet from Recanati had limited himself to some incidental
expressions, to some brief and occasional parenthetical reflections on the
question. On the contrary: in the course of the more than 4000 thoughts of the
Zibaldone formulated between 1817 and 1832, Leopardi was the author of many
reflections, conceptually organic and articulated on philosophy and
philosophers. Reflections
of extreme clarity even linguistically.
Already
in April 1820 (Zibaldone, thought 111) he observed how “philosophy and the use
of pure reason ……. have stiffened and sterilized this poor life, and how all
the beauty of this world consists in the imagination which can be compared to
words and to construction and to various bold and figurative constructions.”
In
truth, the controversy over reason, which is philosophy's elective and
exclusive instrument of investigation, began three years earlier (ZIB.
114,115): "Reason is the enemy of all greatness... I mean that a man will
be less and more unlikely to be great the more he is dominated by reason...
nature is great and reason is small."
A
controversy that will run through the entire composition of the Zibaldone, if
it is true that Leopardi will renew it several times: for example in thought 17
(reason, which he defines as psychological art, has the responsibility of
"making all inspiration, all poetry vanish... and of destroying the
illusion, without which there will be no poetry forever, and the greatness of
the soul and of actions"); or in thought 1825 ("I condemn reason
insofar as it grows and changes in such a way that it becomes the main obstacle
to our happiness, the instrument of our unhappiness, the enemy of the other
natural qualities of man and of human life."); or in a very long series of
other thoughts scattered throughout the collection, not the least of which
Leopardi formulates by borrowing words from Rousseau's Thoughts (1,207):
”La seule
raison n’est point active; elle retient qulquefois,rarement excite, et jamais
elle n’a rien fait de grand”(Zib.4492).
Reason
reveals itself as the permanent polemical idol of Leopardi's thought, made the
object of a progressive and systematic contestation and demolition, which knows
no pauses or breaks or drops in tone. The anti-rationalist polemic of the poet
from Recanati legitimately introduces us to the ideological core of these brief
notes: the troubled relationship between Leopardi and philosophy.
It
was a tormented relationship, lived between criticisms of unusual and
unexpected harshness and explicit, repeated admissions of the extraordinary
potential of philosophy in the implementation of the process of knowledge of
the richness and complexity of human experience. Potential mortified and
sterilized, in Leopardi's opinion, by the unfortunate habit of philosophers,
especially the German ones but not only them, to close themselves in an ivory
tower, in a complacent, arid and sterile self-referentiality, far from what the
poet from Recanati calls "the system of nature". But let us hear
Leopardi: "Accustomed, those philosophers, to not reading, to not
thinking, to not considering, to not studying anything other than philosophy,
dialectics, metaphysics, analysis, mathematics,... their minds completely unpoeticized,...
and to consider and place their profession a thousand miles away from
everything that pertains to imagination and feeling,... identified with pure
reasoning, knowing no other existence in nature than the calculated, the
reasonable, free from every passion, illusion, feeling, they err at every turn
reasoning with the most exquisite accuracy. It is most certain that they have
ignored and ignore the greatest part of nature and of the very things they deal
with... and the greatest part of the very truth to which they have exclusively
dedicated themselves" (Zib.1835|1836 of 4 October 1821).
The
year before, on June 7, 1820, broadening, historicizing and, so to speak,
politicizing the analysis of the limits and inadequacies of philosophy in its
presumption of laying the foundations of the freedom of peoples, he had
affirmed: "The safeguard of the freedom of nations is not philosophy nor
reason... but virtues, illusions, enthusiasm... And a people of philosophers
would be the smallest and most cowardly in the world. Therefore our
regeneration depends on a, so to speak, ultra-philosophy, which, knowing the
intimate and the entirety of things, brings us closer to nature" (Zib.115).
And
nature is for Leopardi life itself, in the richness and complexity of its
manifestations.
Leopardi
reiterates these limits and this inadequacy by underlining the responsibilities
of philosophers: "The analysis of ideas, of man, of the universal system
of beings, must necessarily fall in great and principal part on the
imagination, on natural illusions, on passions, on everything that is poetic in
the entire system of nature.
This
part of nature is not only useful, but necessary to know the other, indeed one
cannot be separated from the other in philosophical meditations. The said
analysis in order to philosophy must be done not by the imagination or the
heart, but by cold reason, which enters into the most secret recesses of both.
But how can he do the said analysis who does not know all the said things from
his own experience or knows them almost nothing?.......he who does not know
nature knows nothing and cannot reason, however reasonable he may be"
(Zib.1835).
So who appears to be the real defendant in this
very harsh indictment by Leopardi? Perhaps philosophy in its autonomous
disciplinary structure, with its rules, its binding constraints that imprison
philosophers within a predetermined conceptual organization, a rigid and
impermeable enclosure of pre-established investigation and research and, above
all, of an exclusively intellectualistic nature, from which the analysis of
that extraordinary interior world of man in which imagination, feeling,
illusions, passions and enthusiasm pulsate at every moment is absolutely and
completely excluded?
Or
are the real defendants the philosophers, especially the Germans, who from the
seventeenth century onwards have in fact transformed philosophy into a sort of
mathematics that uses words instead of numbers in a dialectical exercise,
purely academic, narcissistic and self-referential, whose echo does not go
beyond the walls of the ivory towers within which they have deliberately and
aristocratically locked themselves?
Leopardi's
answer does not lend itself to any kind of misunderstanding: "He who does
not have or has never had imagination, feeling, capacity for enthusiasm, for
heroism, for vivid and great illusions, for strong and varied passions...
absolutely cannot be a great, true and perfect philosopher, indeed he will never
be anything other than a halved philosopher, with short sight, with a very weak
eye, with poor penetration, however diligent, patient, subtle, dialectical and
mathematical he may be; he will never know the truth, he will persuade himself
and prove with possible evidence very false things." (Zib. 1833).
But
he will say even more clearly and explicitly the next day, October 4, 1821:
"The philosopher is not perfect, if he is only a philosopher, and if he
employs his life and himself only to the perfection of his philosophy, of his
reason, to the pure discovery of the truth which is also the only and pure aim
of the perfect philosopher. Reason needs imagination and the illusions that it
destroys" (Zib.1839).
In
other words: if philosophy reveals itself to be a purely intellectualistic
discipline and incapable of projecting its gaze and developing its analyses on
the richness, variety and complexity of the movements of the human soul as they
unfold and manifest themselves in the extraordinary mystery of life, it is due
exclusively to those philosophers who have made philosophy a sort of exclusive
cultural area reserved for sterile yet refined dialectical exercises, incapable
of arousing interest and emotions in readers.
But
Leopardi is perfectly aware of the difficulty of identifying this figure of the
perfect philosopher who is at the same time the supreme philosopher and the
supreme poet: "So you see how difficult it is to find a perfect
philosopher. It can be said that this quality is the rarest and strangest that
can be conceived and that only one arises every ten centuries, if one has ever
arisen." He, retracing the very long history of philosophy, identifies
very few: among the moderns Rousseau and Pascal "almost mad because of the
strength of his imagination at the end of his life"; among the ancients
above all Plato "the most profound, vastest, most sublime philosopher of
all the ancients, who dared to conceive a system which embraced all existence,
and gave reason for all nature, and was in his style and in his inventions as
much a poet as everyone knows" (Zib. 3245 of 23 August 1823).
This
red thread of Leopardi's analysis of philosophy and philosophers will re-emerge
in general lines several times, albeit intermittently but with some subtle
adjustments, some of which are unexpected and surprising, in the more than one
thousand thoughts that constitute the final part of the Zibaldone closed by
thought 4526 of 4 December 1932.
In
the margin of this necessarily synthetic and schematic reconstruction of
Leopardi's analysis, some observations can be made:
1)
It is evident that in Leopardi's reflections the mind and soul of someone who
feels himself first and foremost a poet and the experience (in the semantic
sense of the term) of a restless and tormented human story, lived permanently
between illusions and disappointments in a swing of hope and despair, have
significantly influenced the severe judgment of the poet from Recanati on the
purely intellectualistic, academic and self-referential nature of philosophical
research, especially that conducted by German philosophers between the end of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries;
2)
We do not know whether the criticisms that Leopardi addressed to German
philosophers during the fifteen years of composition of the Zibaldone aroused
the attention and interest of German intellectuals; it seems extremely
unlikely, also because only in the first months of 1832 a dear friend of
Leopardi, the Swiss philologist Luigi De Sinner, who had taken on the task of
disseminating the poet's works in Europe, was able to announce to Leopardi that
the German poet and philologist F.H. Bothe would publish in the magazine
"Altes und neues" the translation of the Ultimo canto di Saffo, of A
Silvia and of the moral operetta the Dialogo di Federico Ruysch e le sue
mummie. Of that publication, however, no trace remains and therefore we cannot
know what reception that initiative had among German intellectuals. But, on the
other hand, within the initiatives launched to spread the figure and the work
of Leopardi in Germany, another event is documented (completely unexpected and
unforeseeable if one considers the initial interest aroused, in truth, more by
the thinker than by the poet among German intellectuals) which caused great
bitterness in the Recanati native: in issue 55 of April 1832 in the magazine
Hesperus published in Stuttgart, the translations of the song Il Sogno edited
by the chief editor Notter and of the moral operetta Il Cantico del gallo
silvestre edited by F. Henschel appeared. The latter, within a broad
bio-bibliographical profile dedicated to Leopardi, referring explicitly to his
philosophical conception, simplistically and banally affirmed that the
painfully pessimistic vision of the Recanati native arose solely from his
infirmity, debasing the depth and complexity of his philosophical meditation.
To
the bitterness was added in the soul of the poet a sort of annoyance generated
by the intellectual crudeness and the uncritical and prejudicial nature of that
judgment, which deliberately avoided addressing the merits of philosophical
questions, even falling into the offense to the human and personal dignity of
the poet. This wounded and mortified state of mind induced Leopardi to a
linguistically and conceptually particularly and unusually harsh response. In
fact, on May 24, 1832 he wrote to his friend de Sinner a letter in French (of
which we report here an excerpt in my Italian translation) in which among other
things he said: "Whatever my misfortunes, I have had enough courage not to
try to alleviate their weight either with frivolous hopes ... nor with the
resignation typical of the weak ... Precisely by virtue of this courage, since
my research directed me to a desperate philosophy, I did not hesitate to
embrace it entirely; ... It is only because of the weakness of men that my
philosophical opinions have been considered the consequence of my sufferings
and that they persist in attributing the origin of my thought to physical
causes. Before I die I want to protest against this invention of intellectual
weakness and vulgarity and ask my readers to try to refute my observations and
my reasoning without calling into question my infirmities.”
Henschel's
remained the only, albeit unpleasant, polemical note in the initial stages of
the process of dissemination of Leopardi's works in Germany; indeed, it can be
said that interest in our author grew progressively to the point that in 1836
in Leipzig the translation of the entire collection of Canti was printed for
the first time, edited by Karl Kanniggiesser on the basis of the Italian
edition of 1831.
3)
In conclusion of this interesting, albeit brief, journey into the surprising,
stimulating and evocative reflections that Leopardi spread over the 15 years of
composition of the Zibaldone on the theme of the relationship between
philosophy and poetry, and between philosophers and poets, the author of these
notes may be forgiven for daring to formulate the following malicious question:
when Leopardi affirmed, and he did so countless times, that the perfect philosopher
must be at the same time the supreme philosopher and the supreme poet, was he
perhaps thinking of himself?
A
question that is not entirely unfounded if one takes into account the opinion
of Emanuele Severino, one of the most illustrious contemporary Italian
philosophers, on Leopardi the philosopher: after having stated that our man is
the perfect incarnation of the “thinking and poetic poet-genius”, he affirmed
that “in this historical circumstance, Leopardi must be recognized for his
merit, as a philosopher, in having laid the foundations for the destruction of
Western tradition, and, as a poet, in having offered, through poetry, not a way
to achieve a happy life, which was the unattainable goal of his existence, but
certainly a way, if not the only one at least the most suggestive, to make life
less barbaric and miserable”.
